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First Day

SECTION ONE
VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS
Richmond, Virginia, December 12-13, 1966

QUESTIONS
1. Susie Wirtz was an elderly spinster who lived in an
old residence in the City of Richmond. She was continually harrassed
by Ezra Sharpey, who insisted that she pay him a sum of money he
contended she owed him on a promissory note secured by a deed of
trust on her .residence. He. threatened to foreclos·,9. the :deerl of
trust unless such payment was made. Becoming frantic, Miss Wirtz
went to see Adam Crock, a Richmond lawyer, explained her plight
and convinced him that she had signed the note and deed of trust
given Sharpey only as a. result of Sharpey's misrepresentations.
Crock, feeling great sympathy for Miss Wirtz, agreed to represent
her and they then signed the following paper:
-

"It is agreed between Susie Wirtz-and Adam
Crock that the latter will act as her lawyer
in-proceedings to be brought against Ezra
Sharpey to have set aside both her note held
by h1m and the deed of trust on her residence
at 1011 S. 10th Street in the City of Richn1ond,
it being further understood that all expenses
of such proceeding will be borne by Adam Crock
without recourse against Susie Wirtz, and that
if such proceeding be successful, Susie Wirtz
will compensate Adam Crock for his services by
executing and delivering a deed conveying to
him an undivided one-fourth interest in such
residence."
Shortly thereafter, at his own expense, Crock commenced an
appropriate proceeding in the Chancery Court of the City of Richmond,
as a result of which the note and deed of trust held by Sharpey were
found void and without effect. Crock then asked Miss Wirtz to
execute and deliver to him a deed conveying an undivided one-fourth
interest in her residence. This she refused to do. Crock has now
brought suit against Miss Wirtz in the Law and Equity Court of the
City of Richmond seeking specific performance of her agreement to
convey to him the undivided interest in her residence. Miss
Wirtz asks your advice on whether she has any defense to the suit
by Crock.
What should your advice be?
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2. Horace Bailey a citizen of and/domic!_led in State X, was
bequeathed the sum of $so,ooo, in securities for life by his uncle,
a citizen of and domiciled in State Y. The uncle's will gave
Bailey the right to appoint by will the sum bequeathed to him. One
year after the unclets death Bailey died, domiciled in State X, and
leaving a paper purporting to be his will. That paper made no
mention of ~he securities bequeathed to him for life, but it did contain a general residuary clause. By the law of State X, _the paper
purporting to be Bailey's will was ineffective as a will and was
denied probate. Under the law of State Y the paper by Bailey was
valid as a will, and the residuary clause was effective as an
exercise of the power of appointment. The residuary legatee, named
in the paper purporting to be Bailey's will, commenced a suit in
State X against Bailey's administrator to recover the securities that
had been left to Bailey for'life.
May the person named as residuary legatee recover?

3. On the trial of Simpson for the murder of Windsor there
was serious doubt as to the identity of the slayer. After proving
that Windsor died on May 31st, as the result of a gunshot wound, the
Commonwealth called Physician as a witness who, if permitted, would
testify that on May 25th he was called to treat Windsor, whom he
found suffering great pain from an abdominal wound and that Windsor
said to him: "Doctor, I am going to die, I can't get well and I
want everyone to know that Simpson shot me." He would also testify
that Windsor rallied during the night, and that the next day said
he was feeling better, and added·: "Simpson had no reason to shoot
me; I wasn't doing anything to him."
Windsor, on May 29th, developed an infection in the wound and
died May 31st. Objection was made to the admissibility of each of
the two statements.
How ought the Court to rule?

4. Plaintiff sued for damages .. for personal injuries alleged
to have been sustained in a train accident. On the trial of the
case his wife was asked the question: "Since this accident what
difference, if any, have you noticed in your husband's ability to
work?" Objection was made by Defendant's counsel on the ground that
this question involved a matter only for medical expert opinion.
How ought the Court to rule?
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5. Distributor wrote Manufacturer a letter in which he
stated: "If you will ship me twenty gross of XYZ appliances, I
will deliver them to Wholesaler and either collect the purchase
price from him and remit it to you, or I will pay it myself."
Manufacturer accepted the offer and, pursuant thereto, shipped the
appliances to Distributor. Not receiving the purchase price,
Manufacturer sued Distributor for it in the proper Circuit Court,
alleging in his motion for judgment that the appliances had been
shipped to Distributor, and that he had either failed to collect
from Wholesaler, or if he had collected, he had failed to remit the
purchase price to Manufacturer; the letter was made a part of the
motion. Distributor demurred to the motion on the ground that the
allegations were in the alternative and did not state which ground
was relied on for recovery.
How ought the Court to rule on the demurrer?

6. Alton was operating his automobile in a westerly
direction and attempted to overtake and pass Be~ne, who was also
operating an automobile in the same direction. Crane was operating
his automobile in an easterly direction on the same highway. There
was a three-way collision, as a result of which all three motorists
were injured. Crane instituted an action against Alton and Beane
to recover damages for his injuries. Alton filed a counterclaim
against Cr~ne because of his injuries and Beane filed a counterclaim
against Crane because of his injuries and for a $1,000 note
Crane owed him; he also filed a cross-claim against Alton for
personal injuries sustained in the wreck. Timely motions were
made as follows:
(A)

To strike out Alton's counterclaim
against Crane.

(B)

To strike out Beane's counterclaim for
damages against Crane.

(C)

To strike out Bea.ne..fs counterclaim on
the note.

(D)

To strike out Beane's erosscla.im against
Alton for damages.

How ought the Court to rule on each motion?

-4-

7. Pedestrian brought an action against Call and Darwin
for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been suffered by
him in a collision between an automobile operated by Call and a
truck operated by Darwin, both of whom denied liability. At the
conclusion of all the evidence both defendants moved for summary
judgments in their favor, and the plaintiff for a directed verdict
in his favor. The Juuge said: nwhile the evidence is somewhat
conflicting, yet I am satisfied that it preponderates in favor of
Call and against Darwin, therefore I sustain Call's motion, and
summary judgment is granted in his favor, and as I am satisfied that
Darwin is liable, I will instruct the jury to find in favor of
Pedestrian against him for such sum, not exceeding the amount sued
for, as the jury may believ~ will compensate Pedestrian for his
injuries." Accordingly, an order was entered granting summary
judgment in favor of Call and the jury was instructed to find a
verdict against Darwin for the damages proven, which they did and
judgment was entered thereon. Proper objections were made to the
actions of the Judge and proper exceptions preserved by all parties.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,
how ought that Court to decide as to the correctness
of th~ action taken in the lower court with respect to:
(1)
(2)

Call's motion for summary judgment;
The instruction to the jury to find a
verdict in favor of Pedestrian against Darwin?

8. Playboy, aged 19 years and wealthy, although he
and his family had always lived in New York, spent the summer of
1965 at Resort in the State of Virginia and, while there, seduced
Unfortunate's daughter, aged 18 years. Unfortunate brought an action,
in the appropriate state court, for seduction against Playboy,.
seeking to recover $50,000 damages. Barrister, a reputable Virginia
lawyer, was appointed as guardian ad litem for Playboy, and process
was served in Virginia on both Playboy and Barrister. Playboy,
believing that he would fare better in a Federal Court than in the
State Court, consults you ten days after the process had been served
on him and asks you:
(a) Within what time and by what procedure he might
seek to secure a trial in the United States District
Court?
(b)

Whether this effort would be successful?
How ought you to answer each question?

9. (1) Willard decided that he must seek an injunction
against Lopez in order to restrain the latter from interfering with
certain business rights of Willard. Willard instituted the proper
proceeding in chancery in the Circuit Court of Northampton County,
but due to various circumstances, a full hearing on the injunction
could not be obtained for some time and Lopez had good reason to
believe that he would lose the testimony of certain important
witnesses because of death or removal from the country before that
time.
What, if anything, can Lopez do to protect himself
against a loss of this testimony?
.(2) Baker was. confronted with the same situation in
regard to Murdock, but due to certain circumstances, he could not
institute his suit in the Circuit Court of Northampton County for
some time and Baker had good reason to believe that he would lose
the testimony of important witnesses because of death or removal
from the country before the time he could institute suit.
What, if anything, can Baker do to protect himself
against the loss of this testimony?
10. Dylan, a member of a swinging group known as the
"Mouldering Mosshangers", recovered a judgment in the Corporation
Court of the City of Chesapeake, Virginia, jointly against Sunny and
Cheryl in the trial of an action at law seeking a recovery for
damages. Dylan alleged and proved that he sustained shock and burns
as a result of the negligence of Cheryl in plugging a known defective
cord into his electric guitar and handing it to Sunny, who, in turn,
negligently threw it into the bathtub where Dylan was taking his
annual bath.
Sunny and Cheryl appealed from the judgment against them
on the ground that erroneous instructions had been given by the
trial court, to which instructions proper exception had been taken.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia found that there was
sufficient evidence of negligence to support a verdict against
both defendants, but that reversible error had been committed in
instructions as to Sunny which would entitle him to a new trial,
but that no reversible error had been committed as to Cheryl.
Under these circumstances, what action should the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia take?
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QUESTIONS
1. Dozier employed Elam, a dealer in second-hand auto
parts and automobiles, to sell Dozier 1 s automobile, and by the
employment letter, Dozier specifically instructed Elam not to make
any warranties but to sell the automobile "as is." Foster knew
Elam was selling the automobile for Dozier, and when Foster expressed interest in the same, Elam, pursuant to the general custom in
the area but in violation of' his instructions, warranted that it was
in first-class condition with each mechanical part in perfect
running order. In fact, it had many defects which could not be
discovered by casual inspection. Foster, relying on the warranty,
purchased the automobile and paid Elam, who deducted his commission
and forwarded the balance to Dozier. Within a week, the automobile
became inoperative because of its defective condition. Foster
consults Lawyer as to his rights against Dozier. -what should Lawyer advise?
2. Shultz, a salaried employee of Gadget Company, invented
on his own time a secret process f"'or manufacturing widgets at a.
considerably reduced cost. Shultz and Gadget Company entered into a
written agreement by which Shultz agreed to give Gadget Company
exclusive use of his invention for twenty-five years and not to make
the same public during this ~eriod of time and Gadget Company agreed
to pay Shultz royalties semi-annually on all net profits from sales.
The agreement also provided that if there should be a breach by
either party, then the other party should give notice of the breach
and the party in error should have thirty days in which to comply,
and, if there was failure of compliance, the contract could be
cancelled by written notice by the aggrieved party. Shultz continued
to work for Gadget Company at his salaried job which had nothing to
do with the production of widgets.
For three years, widgets were manufactured and sold, but no
accounting was given or royalties paid to Shultz, though he
repeatedly requested payment. At the end of three years, Shultz,
Without advising Gadget Company, published an article in a trade
journal disclosing the secret process for manufacturing widgets, and
Gadget Company thereafter gave notice that the agreement was
terminated.
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Shultz brought an action seeking damages in the amount of
all profits for the three-year period. Gadget Company filed a
counterclaim seeking damages because the disclosure of the secret
process allowed its competitors to encroach on its sales market
of widgets.
Assuming that Shultz could prove there were
net profits realized from the sale of widgets
and that Gadget Company could prove that it
sustained damages as a result of the disclosure,
what are the rights, if any, .of each party?

3. Quigg purchase~ a lot in the City of Lynchburg,
Virginia, from Peters and contracted with Reston to construct a
house thereon. Stevens supplied certain materials for the house
pursuant to order of Reston. Quigg paid the entire contract price
to Reston before completion of the house, and Reston abandoned the
job and left the State. Immediately after Reston left, Stevens
approached Quigg and demanded that he pay or execute a note for
$540, the amount remaining due on the material furnished, or he,
Stevens, would file a mechanic's lien on the pro¥erty. Although
Quigg showed that he had made full payment to Reston, Stevens was
adamant in his demand, and Quigg agreed to make payment to Stevens if
he would not file a mechanic's lien and he executed a non-negotiable
note to Stevens for $540. On tpe same day, Owens confronted Quigg
with the fact that he, Owens, had obtained and docketed a judgment
for $450, against Peters shortly before Quigg purchased the property
from Peters and demanded that Quigg pay or execute a note for this
amount or Owens would subject the property to enforcement of the
lien. Quigg agreed to make payment if Owens would not attempt to
enforce the judgment lien and executed a non-negotiable note for the
$450.

Thereafter, Quigg had a change of heart and refused to
pay the notes; whereupon, he was sued separately by Stevens and
Owens.
What defense, if any, does Quigg have to each
of the two actions?

4. Matilda and Dolly, mother and adult daughter, knew that
they would live together and take care of each other during the
remainder of their lives. They found a nice cottage owned by
Fragile, a widower, and offered to buy the same. Fragile's two
children, who were sole beneficiaries under his will, were very much
opposed to the sale of the property, but Fragile ignored their
protests and entered into a valid written contract with Matilda and

-3Dolly for the sale of the property. After the sales contract was
executed, acknowledged, and admitted to record, but prior to the
time for closing and before the deed was executed, Fragile died
testate, with the will stating that all of his property of every
kind should be shared by the two children. The two children directed First Bank, Fragile's executor under the will, to take no action
in regard to the property, contending that it had passed directly
to them under the will.
Matilda and Dolly consult you as to their
rights to have the property conveyed to them?

5. Owl resided on Owl Farm in Loudoun County, Virginia,
and executed a written contract of sale with Monroe by which he
agreed to convey to Monroe "the fee simple title to Owl Farm for a
consideration of $30,000." Before the closing date, it was discovered by both parties that there was an outstanding one-sixth interest
in the prop.erty owned by Nash, a distant relative of Owl, who had
inherited this interest from the predecessor in title. Owl, having
honestly believed that he owned the fee simple &nteres~, did not
consciously misrepresent to Monroe. However, Owl realized he could
be deemed negligent in not knowing of Nash's outstanding interest
before he entered into the con~ract with Monroe. When Nash learned
of the contract and of the facts that Monroe had threatened to bring
suit for specific performance, he advised Owl that if Owl attempted
to convey all or any part of the farm, he, Nash, would bring a suit
to enjoin him or bring an action for damages.
(a)

What are Monroe"s rights against Owl as to
specific performance?

(b)

What are Monroe's rights against Owl in an
action for damages?

(c)

What are Nash's rights against Owl for an
injunction?

(d)

What are Nash's rights against Owl in an
action for damages?

6. Louise decided to sell her home in Giles County,
Virginia, and move to a smaller house, but since she had recently put
in a new water heater and new curtain rods in the Giles house and
wanted to use them in her new home, she advised the real estate agent,
Maxey, that the house was to be sold without the heater and the
rods. Maxey approached Prentis in regard to purchasing the house
and advised that Louise, in selling the property, would reserve the
heater and curtain rods. Prentis raised no objection and agreed. to
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purchase the property. Louise executed the deed, but there was no
mention in the deed of the electric hot water heater or the curtain
rods. Subsequent to the conveyance, Louise obtained a plumber and
came to take the heater and the curtain rods, but Prentis refused
to let her have them, pointing out that the heater was connected
to the hot water system, which was already in the house, was bolted
to the concrete floor and could not be removed without defacing or
injuring the house by cutting the pipes, and that the curtain rods
would have to be unscrewed from the windows. When Prentis was
reminded of Maxey 1 s express statements, he stated that while this
was true, the deed was controlling and since it did not reserve these
items, they, therefore, had passed to him.
Is Louise entitled to either the heater or
the rods in an action of detinue?

7. On Saturday afternoon, at 2:30 o'clock, Rose Gardner
entered the self-service store of Cash & Carry Grocery, Inc., in a
community shopping center in Virginia, for the purpose of doing her
weekly shopping. The shelves upon which the articles of merchandise
were placed were arranged to serve the convenience of the customers,
the bottom shelve~ standing a short distance above the floor. While
reaching to a top shelf to obtafn an article of merchandise, Rose
Gardner placed her right foot three or four inches under the bottom
shelf and when she turned to move away she slipped and fell to the
floor severely injuring her knee. After arising from the floor she
noticed a small dark object about an inch and a half long at one end
of a skid mark on the floor about six inches in length. Upon
examining the object it was determined to be a small onion which was
discolored. The manager of the store was promptly notified and upon
investigation he saw the skid mark, the discolored onion, and
observed that Rose Gardner had a great amount of swelling in her
knee. Shortly thereafter Rose Gardner sued Cash & Carry Grocery,
Inc. to recover damages for her injuries. During the course of the
trial plaintiff proved the foregoing facts. Whereupon, the defendant
proved that the floors of the store were swept clean every evening
after closing and every morning early, as a matter of routine, and
that they were swept at other times when the manager thought it
necessary.
The defend~nt also proved that the floors had been
swept clean on the morning the plaintiff slipped and fell. The
jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and defendant made a
motion to set aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant.
How should the Court rule on the motion to set
aside the verdict and enter judgment for the defendant?
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8. Maria Metcalf was struck by a passenger bus operated by
an employee of Carefree Transportation Company. In an action by
Maria Metcalf against the Company to recover damages for personal
injuries she proved the following facts: that plaintiff was standing
on the sidewalk at the corner of an intersection of two streets;
that the bus, as it approached the intersection of the two streets,
ran up on the sidewallt at the corner of the intersection and struck
plaintiff causing her to sustain a fracture of her right leg, a
fracture of her left arm, and a compression fracture of a lumbar
vertebra; and that the bus was under defendant's exclusive control.
After proving the foregoing facts plaintiff rested her case, whereupon defendant moved the court to strike plaintiff's evidence and to
enter summary judgment for defendant, contending that plaintiff had
not proved any specific act .of negligence on the part of defendant.
How should the Court rule on the motion?

9. An indictment was returned in the Circuit Court of
Pittsylvania County, Virginia, against Marrow Bone charging that he
illegally practiced law before that Court. On motion of Bone this
indictment was quashed and dismissed upon the ground that the offense
charged was barred by the statute of limitations. Shortly after the
indictment had been dismissed, Bone commenced an action in the
Circuit Court of that County against Sam Barrister to recover damages
for malicious prosecution. In his motion for judgment Bone charged
that Barrister maliciously and without probable cause procured the
indictment; that the indictment had been dismissed as the offense
was barred by the statute of limitations; and that Bone had been
seriously damaged in his reputation as a result of the procurement
of the indictment. Barrister filed grounds of defense admitting that
he procured the indictment and that it had been dismissed because
the offense charged was barred by the statute of limitations. He
did not respond to the other averments contained in the motion for
judgment, but he did charge in his grounds of defense that the
charge contained in the indictment was true, and that Bone was guilty
of illegally practicing law. At the trial of the case Bone offered
evidence proving that Barrister procured the indictment and that
Barrister had acted pursuant to a malicious intent on his part to
injure Bone. Bone testified in his own behalf and on crossexamination he admitted that he did not have a license to practice
law in Virginia, and that. the charge contained in the indictment was
true. When plaintiff rested his case defendant moved to strike his
evidence and for summary judgment.
How should the Court rule?

-610. Blue Ridge Livestock, Inc., of Greene County,
Virginia, pursuant to a written order, dated November 15, 1966,
shipped by rail a carload of steers to Southern Cattle Company.
The shipment was f .o.b. at the point of delivery to the carrier.
The purchase mDney was due and payable two days after receipt of
the shipment by the buyer. The carrier issued a nonnegotiable
bill of lading for the shipment. While the shipment was enroute,
the seller learned that the buyer was insolvent and had filed a
voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Before the shipment reached its
destination the carrier, upon directions of the seller, delivered
the carload of steers back to the seller. In an appropriate action
the Trustee in Bankruptcy claimed that he was entitled to take
possession of the steers and to sell them and apply the proceeds of
the sale ratably among the general creditors of Southern Cattle
Company.
How should the Court rule?

